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Time and Fitness in Evolutionary Transitions in Individuality 
Abstract 
It is striking that the concept of fitness although fundamental in evolutionary theory, still remains 
ambiguous. I argue here that time, although usually neglected, is an important parameter in 
regards to the concept of fitness. I will show some of the benefits of taking it seriously using the 
example of recent debates over evolutionary transitions in individuality. I start from Okasha’s 
assertion that once an evolutionary transition in individuality is completed an ontologically new 
level of selection emerges from lower levels of organization. I argue that Okasha’s claim to have 
identified two ontologically distinct levels of selection is an artifact created by an undeserved 
comparison between the fitness of the collective level and the fitness of its constituents. Once 
fitness is assessed over the same period of time at the two levels of organization it becomes clear 
that only one, unique process of selection is acting upon both levels.  
 
 
1. Introduction  
Yes, fitness is the central concept of evolutionary biology, but it 
is an elusive concept. Almost everyone who looks at it seriously 
comes out in a different place.  





It is striking that the concept of fitness, although fundamental in Darwinian Theory, is not yet 
unified, and after more than 150 years still remains ambiguous. Is fitness an ecological descriptor 
or a mathematical predictor? Do species have a fitness, and if they do, how shall we measure it? 
Should fitness be measured over short or long periods of time? All these questions are still 
without clear answers. In this article, I have two aims. First, I will clarify the concept of fitness 
by arguing that time is an important parameter of this concept. Discussions over the concept of 
fitness are numerous and I will not be able to cover them all. Rather, I will concentrate on 
particular benefits that pairing the concept of fitness with time can bring to one contemporary 
discussion over the levels of selection, namely evolutionary transition in individuality (ETI). I 
will demonstrate, and this will be my second aim, that the model of ETIs developed by Okasha 
(2006), relying on Michod and colleagues‟ work, faces a serious problem. This problem, I will 
argue, comes precisely from the fact that in his model Okasha does not sufficiently take time into 
account when measuring fitness at different levels of organization. 
ETIs are events in the course of evolution that lead to the formation of new higher level 
individuals due to the cooperation of two or more individuals at a lower level of organization 
(Michod 2011). One example of ETI is the transition from uni- to multicellular organisms. A 
number of other ETIs have been proposed, among them the transitions from prokaryote to 
eukaryote cells, from unicellular to multicellular organisms, and from multicellular organisms to 
integrated colonies such as colonies of ants or honeybees. One of the most accomplished models 
of ETI is the one suggested by Michod and colleagues. In a number of articles and books 
(Michod 1999, 2005; Michod, Nedelcu, & Roze 2003; Michod, Viossat, Solari, Hurand, & 
Nedelcu 2006) they propose a number of conditions for ETIs to occur. Okasha (2006, 2011) 
recently set Michod and colleagues‟ work in the framework of Multilevel Level Selection 1 
 
 
(MLS1)/ Multi Level Selection 2 (MLS2), which was initially developed by Damuth and Heisler 
(1988). 
Okasha‟s and Michod‟s models of ETIs are committed to a concept of fitness which is 
measured by the ability of a given entity to survive and reproduce in its environment. According 
to this definition, the higher the survival and reproductive rate of this entity, the higher its fitness 
is. Although such definition is somewhat restrictive and does not cover the whole range of 
possibilities which can be embraced by the concept of fitness, I will accept it as common ground 
for the development of my arguments, which will run as follows. In Section 2, I will briefly 
review Michod and colleagues‟ as well as Okasha‟s models of ETIs in regards to fitness. I will 
present two specific claims defended by both authors: (1) that during the last stage of an ETI, 
once a division of labor is in place, the fitness of the components constituting the newly emerged 
individual reaches zero; (2) that there are two fundamentally distinct processes of selection, 
namely multilevel selection 1 (MSL1) and multilevel selection 2 (MLS2), occurring alternately 
at the different stages of an ETI. Claims (1) and (2) are slightly different versions of what is 
called the export-of-fitness view on ETI. Claim (1) has been recently criticized by Godfrey-
Smith (2011, 77-78) for its metaphorical nature. Although this criticism deserves a more 
thorough examination, that will not be done in this article. In Section 3, I turn to claim (2) and 
demonstrate that if fitness is assessed over the same period of time at the collective level and at 
the level of its constituents, then there is commensurability between these two models of 
selection. For that reason, they cannot represent two ontologically distinct processes of selection, 
but are ways to describe the same process from the perspective of two spatial and two temporal 
scales. However, I do not deny the epistemological value of describing ETIs within the 




2. Michod and Okasha on evolutionary transitions in individuality 
Michod and colleagues propose the following model of ETI. For new individuals at a higher 
level (“collective” level) to emerge from a lower level (“particle level”)1, e.g. for multicellular 
organisms to emerge from unicellular organisms, two things must happen. First, conflicts 
between members of the collective need to be eliminated. Conflicts can be resolved in different 
ways such as for instance policing mechanisms and developmental bottlenecks, to name two of 
them. They both promote genetic homogeneity and consequently reduce competition between the 
different members of a group. However, even if genetic homogeneity is reached between the 
different members of the same group, this will not necessarily lead to the emergence of a higher 
individual. For an ETI to take place, Michod and colleagues propose that there must be a division 
of labor between germ and soma (or its equivalent in ETIs other than from uni- to multicellular 
organisms), since without it, the collective fitness will be proportional to the average particle 
fitness. As such, the collective will not be an individual with its own fitness (Michod 2005, 569); 
its fitness will merely be a cross level by-product of  its particles‟ fitness.  
 
Claim 1 
As I noted earlier, Michod and colleagues define the fitness of an entity (whether particle or 
collective) as the product of its viability and fecundity, which is often done in life-history 
models. In the cases of transition from unicellular to multicellular organisms with full separation 
                                                             
1
 The distinction between particle and collective comes from Okasha (2006, 4)  
 
 
of germ and soma, if a cell does not specialize, it will invest its resources in both the viability 
and fecundity components of fitness. As a result its fitness will be positive. However, Michod 
(2005, 2011) and Okasha (2009) both generalize this argument over other ETIs and propose that: 
(1) If a particle invests everything in the somatic (or germ) function (or its equivalent) of the 
future collective individual, it will have a fitness equal to 0, since although its viability 
(or fecundity) component of fitness will be positive, its fecundity (or viability) 
component and consequently the product of viability and fecundity will be nil.  
However, when the two types of particles combine their investment in both components of 
fitness (one investing everything in the soma and the other everything in the germ function) a 
new collective individual emerges with its own fitness. This reasoning leads Michod and 
colleagues to claim that during an ETI transfer of fitness from the particle to the collective level.  
 
Claim 2 
Okasha (2006) and Michod (2005, 2011), mostly relying on Okasha‟s analysis, both link this 
work to the two concepts of multilevel selection distinguished by Damuth and Heisler (1988), 
namely MLS1 and MLS2. In the MLS1 framework, the focal unit of selection is the particle. For 
that reason fitness is expressed in a number of particles produced. For example, a group of 
particles will have a higher fitness than another if ceteris paribus it produces more particles. In 
MLS1, the fitness of the collective is merely a “by-product” of the different fitnesses of the 
particles composing this collective. In the MLS2 framework, the focal units of selection are both 
the particle and the collective. Fitnesses of the collective and of the particle are measured in 
different units. The fitness of a collective is expressed in number of new groups it produces 
 
 
independently of the number of particles each group is composed of, while the fitness of a 
particle is simply expressed in number of particles it produces. During an ETI, Okasha (2006, 
237-238) argues, there are three stages for which MLS1 and MLS2 are alternately more relevant 
to describe the selection process and propose that: 
(2)  MLS1 and MLS2 are two distinct causal processes of selection as opposed to two 
conventional ways of expressing selection (2006, 59; 2011, 243). During an ETI, they 
represent a transition in processes of selection. Not only MLS1 and MSL2 are alternately 
more relevant at the different stages of an ETI, they are alternately the only way to 
describe accurately the process of selection. 
In the first stage of an ETI, the particles of the future collective start to aggregate and cooperate. 
The fitness of this newly formed collective is merely the average of the particles‟ fitness, hence 
MLS1 is the relevant type of selection occurring. During the second stage, the fitness of the 
collective is not defined in terms of the particles any more, but is proportional to the average 
fitness of the particles. At that stage, although MLS2 framework can be applied, so can MLS1. 
There is a “grey area between MLS1 and MSL2”, in Okasha‟s words (2006, 237). However, the 
collective lacks individuality, since its fitness is a cross-level byproduct of the particles‟ fitness. 
During the third stage, when the transition is complete, the fitness of the collective cannot be 
expressed as the average fitness of the particles any more. The collective is now an individual on 
 
 





3. When time makes a difference  
Where does the incommensurability between particle and collective fitnesses come from? To 
this question there is no clear answer and it is not clear how there could be one even in principle. 
It is in fact hard to imagine that collectives could exhibit variations in fitness, without their 
constitutive parts exhibiting a form of variation with consequences on their own fitness. Yet 
Okasha believes that such scenarios exist (Okasha 2006, 106) and that they materialize when 
MLS2 is the framework of choice, for MLS2 framework, he claims, fits two causally distinct 
processes of natural selection happening in nature (Okasha 2006, 59; 2011, 243). Recall that in 
MLS2 framework, the fitness of the collective can be defined as a quantity “that bears no 
necessary relation to average particle fitnesses alone” (2006, 136, my emphasis). Yet, in the 
same sentence Okasha surprisingly asserts that “it is impossible that the resulting evolutionary 
change could be expressed in terms of particle fitnesses alone,” Okasha (2006, 136, my 
emphasis). Beyond, the fact that the consequence does not follow from the premise (Okasha 
should have used “sometimes impossible” instead of “impossible”), I propose one important 
reason why we should doubt this claim in any case. I will not argue here either against the MLS2 
framework itself since it is obviously mathematically true. Rather, I will argue against the claim 
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 Michod and colleagues use the word „decoupling‟ to refer to this phenomenon. By decoupling 
they mean that the fitness at the collective level becomes expressed in a different currency than 
fitness at the particle level and that it is not translatable into fitness at that level 
 
 
that there is incommensurability between the particle and collective fitnesses in any real cases of 
evolution by natural selection. The reason I will give is based on purely methodological grounds 
linked to time, fitness and levels of organization and will be illustrated with one of Okasha‟s own 
example of MLS2.  
In chapter 7 Okasha (2006) deals with species selection, the paradigmatic case of MLS2 in 
the literature on the subject, and embraces Vrba‟s „acid test‟ (1989, 155) to detect true species 
selection (and more generally MLS2) from mere by-products of selection at lower levels, as in 
MLS1. Vrba proposes that there is true species selection when the outcome of selection at the 
species level cannot be explained from the perspective of the organism. One stringent way to 
know when this happens is to seek different directions of selection at the different levels of 
organization. For instance, species selection, if truly independent, could in principle counteract 
selection at the organism level. Vrba‟s test will however be inconclusive when both selection 
processes push in the same direction, but the most reasonable attitude to adopt in such case will 
be to consider that selection only really occurs at the lower level, unless one would be able to 
display that the force at the species level has different value from the force at the organism level. 
Okasha claims that one example of true species selection satisfying Vrba‟s test is involved in the 
evolution/maintenance of sexual reproduction. He asserts that asexuality is advantageous at the 
organism level, because of the two-fold cost of producing males (Maynard Smith 1978), but that 
sexuality is advantageous at the species level because it allows faster evolutionary responses to 
rapid changes in environmental conditions. According to this reasoning, sexual lineages would 
be selected via species selection as a distinct process of natural selection different from selection 
at the organism level which favors asexual organisms.  
 
 
One fundamental principle of the scientific method in experiments is to change only one 
variable at a time while the other are kept unchanged or controlled. To reach this goal, if one is 
interested in measuring the influence of X (a drug, for instance) on a population P, the 
experimenter will need to control the effect of X on P with another population (let us call it P‟ or 
Control) which was not administered X but which is as similar to P as possible in all other 
respects. Hence, if a difference is observed between the two populations, it will only be 
attributable to X because no other variable will be different. However, if P and P‟ are not strictly 
identical in all respects but X, then any observed difference could be attributable to X or any of 
the other different variable between the two populations and which could have the same effect 
than X. Such variables are called confounding variables. How is that relevant to our problem of 
species selection and Vrba‟s test? Vrba‟s test is not a scientific experiment per se, but it shares 
with them the necessity to be controlled. Unless all the variables relevant to selection are strictly 
identical at both levels in the test, the detection of a different direction of selection at those levels 
could be attributed either to a different process of selection at each level or to any other variable 
with different values at each level and with some relevance to selection. Just like any scientific 
experiment, Vrba‟s test requires that only one variable at a time is changed while all the other are 
kept unchanged.  
We noted earlier that Okasha claims that the evolution/maintenance of sexual reproduction is 
a true case of species selection. He justifies this assertion using Vrba‟s test. Because, he argues, 
the test shows that selection pushes in two opposite directions (i.e. sexuality at the species level 
and asexuality at the organism level), a process of selection ontologically different from the 
process of selection at the organism level, must exist at the species level. But does Okasha‟s 
comparison eliminate all possible confounding variables, which would render his conclusion 
 
 
spurious? In other words, is selection at the organism level assessed in the exact same way at the 
species level? The answer to this question is that it is not; a confounding variable does exist.  
To detect this confounding variable, let us consider two types of organisms, one asexual and 
one sexual, under the same selection pressures. To reproduce, sexual organisms spend energy 
both to look for a partner and to produce gametes during meiosis, while only half of their genes 
will be represented at the next generation. On the contrary, asexual organisms will be able to 
reproduce genetically identical offspring, without any cost from meiosis or courtship and mating. 
Hence if the two types of organisms are in competition, the asexual ones should quickly out-
compete the sexual ones, because of the supplementary costs associated to sexual reproduction. 
At that point, it is thus extremely tempting to claim that the fitness of an asexual organism is 
higher than the fitness of a sexual organism. But, if formulated as such, this claim would be 
incomplete and would have to be relativized over a period of time (e.g. one generation). 
 Why is that? First, because the fitness of an organism cannot be directly measured as, for 
instance, the mass of an object can be; measures of fitness are only proxies for fitness. Second, 
because different proxies for fitness can lead to different answers. Hence, the information about 
the way fitness is measured is always relevant. In fact, the reproductive output after one 
generation of an organism represents only one proxy for its fitness among an infinite number. 
There is no “best” period of time over which one can measure fitness. This type of problems 
leads Beatty & Finsen (1989) and Sober (2002) to propose a distinction between short-term and 
long-term fitness. In most cases the short-term reproductive output of an entity is a good proxy 
for fitness to grasp the evolutionary dynamics of interest. But at other times it might be 
insufficient, and we will need a proxy measuring the reproductive output over a longer period of 
time. One famous case, proposed by Fisher (1930) on sex ratio, makes the reproductive output 
 
 
two generations ahead a much better proxy for fitness than one generation. More generally, 
proxies of fitness over long periods of time should be preferred if one is interested in 
evolutionary problems involving changes in the environment, as it is the case with the evolution 
and maintenance of sexual reproduction. This is because long term environmental changes and 
their consequences on selection pressures will be invisible to a proxy for fitness based on the 
short term reproductive output. Yet, many evolutionary problems do not involve such changes 
and measuring fitness as the reproductive output over one generation is fine because the 
environment usually does not change or changes very little over one generation. This is the case 
for instance if one wants to know what phenotype is optimal in a constant environment.  
The confounding variable in Okasha‟s comparison becomes now obvious. It is the time over 
which fitness is assessed, which is itself a proxy for environmental changes. At the organism 
level, fitness is usually measured as the reproductive output after one organism‟s generation. At 
the species level, fitness is measured as the rate of extinction or speciation over much longer 
periods of time, sometimes many millions of years. But commensurability necessarily exists 
between fitness of species and fitness of organisms. Speciation and extinction events are 
ultimately composed of the deaths, survivals and reproductions of organisms over many 
generations, since the former events supervene on the latter ones. Thus, when Okasha applies 
Vrba‟s test over the maintenance/evolution of sex, he compares the fitness of organisms over one 
generation at the organism level with the fitness of organisms over a much higher number of 
generations
3
. Performed as such, Vrba‟s test remains inconclusive. Indeed, the difference 
observed could be either due to two processes of selection pushing in two opposite direction or to 
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 In virtue of the supervenience of speciation and extinction events at the species level on death, 
survival and reproduction events at the organism level 
 
 
two measures of one and the same process of selection over two different periods of time, 
pushing in one direction over the short term and in the other over the long term. In the rest of the 
article, I defend the latter possibility. 
To see why, let us now perform Vrba‟s test while controlling the period of time over which 
fitness is measured. Controlling time could be done in two ways: (a) by measuring fitnesses at 
both the species level and the organism level over one organism generation and compare them 
over this period of time; (b) by measuring the two fitnesses over the period time that would 
normally be used to measure species‟ fitness, that is, a period long enough to detect events of 
speciation or extinction. Both alternatives seem to be doomed in practice, since we are neither 
able to measure the fitness of species over short periods of time, nor able to measure the fitness 
of organisms over periods of time longer than a few generations. But if we were able to do so, 
we would certainly find that ceteribis paribus asexual organisms and asexual species have a 
higher short-term fitness as measured by (a) than sexual organisms and sexual species, but have a 
lower long-term fitness as measured by (b). The reason for that is not mysterious. Asexual 
organisms and asexual species on average do better when the conditions are stable (as it is 
usually the case over one generation) while sexual organisms and sexual species do better when 
new environmental conditions arise (which certainly occur over several millions of years). In 
other words, both selection at the organism and the species level would go in the same direction 
once the test is controlled for the period of time over which fitness is measured.  
Thus, Okasha‟s claim that the evolution/maintenance of sexual reproduction occurs as a 
result of species selection is inexact. If we follow his reasoning using time as a constant over 
fitness (itself as a proxy for the stability of the environment), we predict no difference between a 
measure of selection made at the level of the organism and another one made at the level of the 
 
 
species. The most natural implication is that these different measures represent one and the same 
process of natural selection, but expressed in different terms and over different periods of time.  
There is no logical barrier to extending this argument to all the other cases for which MLS2 
has been the framework of choice. In each case, if fitness could be determined over the same 
period of time or in the same constant environment at each level, what seems to be ontologically 
different levels of selection could in principle be unified under one and the same process. Does it 
mean that MLS2 framework should be abandoned and always replaced by MLS1? I claim that it 
should not, unless one has the full availability, at any point in time, of the selection pressures on 
the particles under consideration. I can only see multilevel models as satisfying these criteria. In 
any real case, the complete list of selection pressures will be most of the time unknown or they 
will be constantly changing (e.g. frequency dependent selection) making thus the particle 
fitnesses extremely complex to determine over long period of time. When both particle and 
collective fitnesses are available, and that the question at stake is about the collective, I propose 
that the MLS2 framework should be privileged. There are two further reasons for this choice. 
First, the complex task of measuring fitness of all the particles within a collective (with all the 
non-linear relations it implies) and over many particles‟ generations will often materialize at the 
collective level into a single and easily measurable parameter: the collective‟s reproductive 
output. Second, keeping fitness of the particles and fitness of the collectives independent, as it is 
done in MLS2 framework, can bring different, yet relevant, information about the selection since 
they are measured over different periods of time.  
After these general consideration on MLS2 what does the distinction MLS1/MLS2 become 
in the context of ETIs and especially during their last stage? Would it be, in principle, possible, 
at the last stage, to describe the fitness of a collective in terms of the fitnesses of its particles, 
 
 
contra Okasha? Following the reasoning I used in the case of the evolution/maintenance of sex, 
as in any case of MLS2, I see nothing that would prevent it. During an ETI, if the fitness of the 
particles seems incommensurable with the fitness of the collective, it is most probably due to the 
fact that, during the last stage, both fitnesses are not measured over the same period of time 
anymore and that the interactions between particles become so complex that tracking back their 
fitness over longer periods of time than one or two generation appears in practice impossible. 
What becomes decoupled in the two levels is not fitness per se but generations or life cycles. 
Because Michod‟s proxy for fitness depends on reproductive output after one generation, if “one 
generation” does not mean the same thing at the particle and the collective level, it is not 
surprising that collective and particle fitnesses seem decoupled from each other. But this is an 
artifact created by the measure. That does not mean that MLS2 represents an ontologically 
distinct process of selection from MLS1. Rather, it suggests that MLS2 is very useful means to 
carve one single processes of natural selection both in time and space and becomes especially 
useful once an ETI is completed. This echoes a recent criticism made by Waters (2011) about 
Okasha‟s fundamentalism over the distinction between MLS1/MLS2 in which he claimed that 
MLS1 and MSL2 frameworks were conventional rather than fundamental. Okasha (Okasha 
2011, 243) held his ground, restating that they were fundamental. I have provided evidence here 
that they clearly were conventional and it became apparent once measures of fitness were 





I have demonstrated that time is an extremely important parameter to take into account in 
regards to the concept of fitness. I argued for its relevance in ETIs and, more generally, in the 
levels of selection debate. I used the evolution/maintenance of sexual reproduction as a case 
study to establish that if different proxies of fitness reflecting different time scales are used at the 
organism and species levels, this will have the consequence of measuring selection pressures 
over two different time scales. This can lead one to confound the existence of one unique process 
of selection over two different periods of time with two ontologically distinct processes of 
selection, one for each level. I applied the same reasoning to ETIs and argued that they were not 
transitions in processes of selection, but rather events for which MLS1 and MLS2 were, although 
ultimately formally equivalent, alternately more relevant. The claim that distinction between 
collective selection and particle selection is conventional is not new (e.g. : Dugatkin & Reeve 
1994; Sterelny 1996) and Kerr & Godfrey-Smith (2002) have formalized this equivalence. Yet, 
as Okasha (2006, 136) rightly points out, this formalism has been made solely in the context of 
MLS1. Taking time as an important variable in measures of fitness represents one important step 
towards a formalism in which events of selection normally described under the MLS2 
framework, such as the last stage of ETIs, could also be, described under the MLS1 framework.  
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